The models get core assumptions wrong — the hot spot is missing 22 — 26, 28 — 31 Clouds cool the planet as it warms 38 — 56 The models are wrong on a local, regional, or continental scale. Figure 1 Climate Sensitivity Comparison empirical methods versus models, for a doubling of the CO2 level.
In particular, we identified how embedded commissions give rise to conflicts of interest that misalign the interests of investment fund managers, dealers and representatives with those of the investors they serve.
Embedded commissions raise conflicts of interest that misalign the interests of investment fund managers, dealers and representatives with those of investors; 2. Embedded commissions limit investor awareness, understanding and control of dealer compensation costs; and 3.
Embedded commissions paid generally do not align with the services provided to investors. The evidence we have gathered to date shows that embedded commissions encourage the sub-optimal behavior of fund market participants, including that of investment fund managers, dealers, representatives and fund investors, which reduces market efficiency and impairs investor outcomes.
In particular, the data and research we reviewed suggests that embedded commissions can: These issues and their causes appear to be driven by a compensation model with inherent conflicts of interest that research suggests are pervasive and are difficult to manage effectively.
Based on the evidence we have gathered, we believe that a change to a different compensation model must be considered. Investors should be provided with a compensation model that empowers them and that better aligns the interests of investment fund managers, dealers and representatives with those of investors.
Consultation on direct pay arrangements Before taking any regulatory action, and while we consider related regulatory initiatives underway, we want to consult with stakeholders on the potential option of discontinuing embedded commissions and transitioning to direct pay arrangements that: Direct pay arrangements could consist of various types of compensation arrangements including upfront commissions, flat fees, hourly fees, fees based on a percentage of assets under administration or other arrangements, provided in all cases: Under a direct pay model, we would expect dealers to offer their clients a compensation arrangement that suits their particular investment needs and objectives and the level of service desired.
Investment fund managers could facilitate investors' direct payment of dealer compensation through payments taken from the investor's investment for e. We recognize that such a change could have a profound effect on the fund industry and on investors in Canada, including potential unintended consequences.
Therefore, a decision on whether to discontinue embedded commissions will only be reached after careful consideration and assessment of the possible impacts on investors and market participants and consultation with stakeholders.
Accordingly, the aims of this consultation paper Consultation Paper are to obtain the requisite information the CSA needs to make an informed decision about discontinuing embedded commissions. Specifically, our objectives are to: We emphasize that we have not made a decision to discontinue embedded commissions.
While we continue to consult and contemplate whether regulatory action should be taken to address the issues we have identified with the current commission-based compensation model, we encourage industry to create market-driven solutions and innovations that address the concerns we raise in this Consultation Paper, including adopting business models that: Impact analysis This consultation will build on our previous consultations and the important body of research we have considered to date.
We particularly seek from stakeholders analysis and perspectives that: The fund industry has to date provided research that finds that higher levels of wealth are achieved by advised investors over time, and maintains that embedded commissions are essential to delivering this benefit, particularly to investors with lower levels of wealth who may not otherwise be able to afford, or may not want to pay directly for, advice.
The fund industry has also pointed to the consequences of relevant regulatory reforms in other jurisdictions such as the U.
While observations about the impacts of relevant reforms in other jurisdictions are informative and insightful, we consider that the potential impacts from similar reforms in Canada might not be the same. The unique features of those foreign markets, including the characteristics of their respective market participants and the specific competitive dynamics within which they operate, their market structure, the savings habits of their local investors, as well as the scope of their respective reforms may all play a role in shaping the specific impacts.
The objective of this consultation is therefore to identify the potential effects of discontinuing embedded commissions in Canada based on what we know of our fund market and its participants, including our investment fund managers, our dealers, and the investors they currently serve.
This objective includes understanding the potential impact such a change may have on the accessibility and affordability of advice for Canadian investors, including lower-wealth investors, and identifying ways to minimize this impact.
Ultimately, our goal is to ensure that any regulatory action we may decide to take will provide a Canadian solution to challenges specific to the Canadian market, will result in more positive outcomes for Canadian investors and will minimize disruption for market participants.
For this purpose, the contribution of the stakeholders to this consultation is very important. We also understand that industry participants are concerned by the number of current policy initiatives that affect their business and that require substantial changes in their operations and systems.
Industry has urged us to allow full implementation of the POS and CRM2 reforms and fairly assess their results, and conclude consultations under CSA CPbefore signaling that significant new reforms are needed.
We are of the view that the discontinuation of embedded commissions could be complementary to our recent reforms and proposals in that those existing and ongoing initiatives were not designed to, and may not fully address, the key investor protection and market efficiency issues we have identified in this Consultation Paper.
In particular, we think that as long as dealer compensation remains embedded in the fund product, investment fund managers may continue to place greater emphasis on payments to dealers than on performance to gather and preserve assets under management.Corporate Governance Exam Paper.
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